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1 Executive Summary 
The early detection of the biological and chemical contamination of water distribution 
systems is a necessary capability for securing the nation’s water supply.  Current and 
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emerging early-detection technology capabilities and shortcomings need to be identified 
and assessed to provide government agencies and water utilities with an improved 
methodology for assessing the value of installing these technologies.  The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has tasked a multi-laboratory team to evaluate current and 
future needs to protect the nation’s water distribution infrastructure by supporting an 
objective evaluation of current and new technologies. The LLNL deliverable from this 
Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD) was to assist the development of a 
technology acquisition process for a water distribution early warning system.  The 
technology survey includes a review of previous sensor surveys and current test programs 
and a compiled database of relevant technologies. In the survey paper we discuss 
previous efforts by governmental agencies, research organizations, and private 
companies.  We provide a survey of previous sensor studies with regard to the use of 
Early Warning Systems (EWS) that includes earlier surveys, testing programs, and 
response studies.  The list of sensor technologies was ultimately developed to assist in the 
recommendation of candidate technologies for laboratory and field testing. A set of 
recommendations for future sensor selection efforts has been appended to this document, 
as has a down selection example for a hypothetical water utility. 
 
2 Introduction 
The security of our nation’s water distribution systems is a major concern since the 
events of September 11, 2001. Prior to that time, water contamination concerns were 
primarily in regard to natural events and accidental contaminant release while intentional 
threats were considered fringe events (Brosnan, 1999). A notable exception, however, 
was the US Air Force concern of intentional contamination/destruction of military water 
distribution systems (Hickman, 1999). After September 2001, the protection and safety of 
municipal, private and military water distribution systems from intentional contamination 
has become a priority to ensure an uninterrupted supply of drinkable water to the public 
in adequate quantities and under adequate water pressure to satisfy public health, 
firefighting, and industrial needs. It is to satisfy the needs of the water utilities in their 
mission of serving the public with a safe water supply that we have based this water 
monitoring sensor survey and technology-acquisition strategy presented below. 
 
While it has been understood for some time that environmental contamination of water 
distribution systems is a threat to the mission of the water utilities (ASCE, 2004), it has 
been identified by the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Research 
Council (2003) that water distribution systems are vulnerable to deliberate contamination 
in part because there are many readily available access points. The prevention and 
detection of intentional contamination events are directly relevant to previous and 
ongoing efforts at preventing and detecting unintended or natural contamination events.  
Consequently, efforts concerning intentional contamination must leverage off of and 
contribute to efforts concerning accidental and natural releases. Many threats and 
vulnerability assessments to US water systems have focused primarily on unintended 
and/or natural contamination.  The US Air Force (Hickman, 1999), the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2004), the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment (2003), the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (2004), the American 
Water Works Association (Schreppel, 2003), the American Society of Civil Engineers 
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(ASCE, 2004), and De Young and Gravely, 2002 are a just a few of the military, federal, 
state, local, and privately funded studies that have recently examined these threats.   Early 
Warning Systems, EWS, the focus of many these studies, is defined as an integrated 
system consisting of monitoring technology, analysis and interpretation, and, ultimately, 
decision-making for protecting public health while minimizing unnecessary concern and 
inconvenience within a community (Hasan et al, 2004).   
 
Water utilities can address the threat of deliberate contamination through improved 
physical security and water monitoring and emergency response planning and execution.  
Implementation of water monitoring capabilities begins with the non-trivial process of 
sensor selection. In this document we present a survey of previous and on-going studies 
of EWS sensor technology that is followed by a discussion of options and constraints to 
be faced by water utilities when choosing an EWS sensor technology for their 
distribution system.   Based on discussion with members of the DHS Operational 
Technology Demonstration Project Advisory Board (consisting of representatives from 
the EPA, AWWA, DHS, NASA and individual water utilities) and on the literature, we 
have assembled a list of the most important parameters affecting water utilities’ choice of 
sensor technology.  These parameters allow us to create a list of ranked criteria to assist 
sensor selection decisions faced by water utilities when designing a water-distribution 
monitoring system including sensor selection, sensor testing, sensor placement, and alarm 
response (detect-to-warn or detect-to-treat).     
 
3 Water Monitoring Sensor Technology Survey 
3.1 Review of Technology Surveys 
We identified several different agencies and their reports detailing and evaluating the 
design of online water monitoring warning systems, and we found a commonality of 
issues within all of the reports. For online monitoring systems, each report listed similar 
needs for EWS, such as the following:  
• The identification of surrogate water quality parameters as the best approach for 
distribution system monitoring for contamination events. 
• The need for a clear understanding of the normal variability of baseline water 
data to aid in the interpretation of surrogate water quality data during a 
contamination event. 
• The understanding that distribution system contaminant transport modeling is an 
important component of an overall EWS design architecture.   
• The need to determine the objective of an EWS in terms of detect-to-warn and 
detect-to-treat. 
• The need for established emergency response protocols and procedures. 
• The development of advanced water monitoring sensors that can meet cost, 
reliability and performance parameters identified generally by the water utility 
industry and specifically by individual utilities.   
The pathway to meeting these needs is not straightforward and is continually evolving. 
Listed below and tabulated in Table 1 are the findings from each report detailing 
previous efforts of different agencies. 
 
ILSI Report (1999) 
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The International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) published in 1999 their workshop 
findings focusing on three specific areas: (1) threats to drinking water supplies from low 
probability/high public health impact events; (2) early warning monitoring approaches; 
and (3) interpretation, risk management, and public communication issues. The report 
reflects the expertise of scientists from government, industry, academia, and the public 
interest sector and presents a concise assessment of (1) threats, (2) vulnerability, (3) EWS 
requirements, (4) EWS design, (5) the of monitoring chemical, radioactive, and microbial 
contaminants, (5) data interpretation, and (6) emergency response.  
 
AwwaRF (2002) 
In 2002, the American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AwwaRF) 
published extensive findings from a study of online monitoring for drinking water 
utilities which was funded by AwwaRF and the Italian Public Services Research Council 
(CRS PROAQUA). This study identified the following needs:  (1) the need for online 
monitoring; (2) the need for specifications and testing of online monitors; (3) the need for 
proper selection of online monitoring equipment; sensors to monitor physical, inorganic, 
organic, biological, flow, level, and pressure parameters; and (4) the need for proper data 
handling and validation. Detailed and specific information is presented in this report for 
each of the different technologies used to monitor water quality and distribution system 
conditions. 
 
ASCE (2004) 
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) prepared the WISE Report in 2004 that 
provides comprehensive analyses and guidelines for designing an online contaminant 
monitoring system. The report covers several relevant topics including (1) a discussion of 
the contamination problem, (2) a rationale for online monitoring, (3) system design 
basics, (4) the use of contaminant lists, (5) the importance of detection limits, (6) the 
selection and placement of instruments and platforms, (7) data analysis and the use of 
models, (8) communication system requirements, (9) responses to contamination events, 
(10) the need to interface with existing surveillance systems, and (11) operations, 
maintenance, upgrades, and exercises of the system.  
 
 
Table 1.  Previous Design Standards and Surveys 
Study Comments Reference 
ILSI Report Pre September 11 concerns ILSI, 1999 
AWWA Report AWWARF, CRS PROAQUA AWWA, 2002 
ASCE WISE Report M&C Subcommittee Design Guidance and Survey ASCE, 2004 
KIWA Report Report-of-Technology Kiwa, 2004 
EPA/NHSRC Research Action Plan EPA, 2004 
AWWA Report Water Utility Perspective AWWA, 2005 
 
 
AwwaRF, Kiwa (2004) 
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In close collaboration, AwwaRF and Kiwa (a Dutch water research organization) 
conducted the Early Warning Monitoring project and presented the results in a 2004 final 
draft report titled Early Warning Monitoring in the Drinking Water Sector. This 
document details an effort to develop an overview of sensor development and identifies 
the developments that are potentially applicable as early warning techniques:  (1) criteria 
for the prioritization of contaminants; (2) results from several transport modeling studies 
that were used to examine the spread of a contaminant through a water supply and 
evaluation of the boundary conditions for an effective EWS; (3) criteria for selection of 
an early warning system; (4) detection techniques for chemical priority agents; and (5) 
early warning systems (EWS) selected for further evaluation. The contaminant transport 
modeling studies highlight the necessity of hydraulic modeling to assist with the 
determination of network contamination and the relationship between the number of 
sensors and the overall impact of a contamination event. 
 
EPA (2004) 
The 2004 EPA report Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan 
EPA/600/R-04/063, identifies important water security issues, describes research and 
technical support needs, and presents a list of relevant projects responsive to these 
concerns. This action plan was developed in collaboration with the National Homeland 
Security Research Center (NHSRC), the Water Security Division (WSD), their federal 
partners, and various stakeholders. 
 
AWWA (2005) 
In early 2005, AWWA convened a Utility Users’ Group Workshop to discuss and 
evaluate the security issues that are of prime concern to water utilities. A written report 
discusses the perspective and evaluations of chemical warning systems, contamination 
indicators, data transmission and analysis, alarms and/or triggers, and response. From this 
effort, recommendations and questions were generated for improving the overall security 
of water distribution systems.  
 
The important points gleaned from our survey in regard to sensor selection criteria are the 
following: 
1. Because the desired sensors are non-specific, it is necessary to require a detect-to-
treat system where a sensor alert would trigger a sample to be collected and held 
for collection and thorough analysis at a traditional laboratory.  
2. It will be important to understand and characterize the sensor responses to normal 
changes in the water system quality in order to minimize the false positive 
occurrences and ensure adequate sensitivity to alert when water quality 
parameters exceed normal baseline conditions.  
3. It is critical to understand baseline water quality under all possible normal 
conditions such as changes in source water, disinfection, seasonal and system 
temperature changes.  
 
3.2 Review of Sensor Testing 
To determine if a developed sensor is appropriate for a particular application, the sensor 
performance needs verification by laboratory- and field-testing to determine whether or 
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not the sensor’s sensitivity and accuracy is appropriate for the proposed application. A 
deployable sensor must be able to provide useable data, and it must be able to detect a 
sudden relative change in concentration over a baseline value. In the case of surrogate 
measures, it is the change in the system that indicates a potential problem (ASCE, 2004). 
 
Several of the current commercially available sensor systems measure surrogate 
parameters (e.g., physical parameters such as temperature, turbidity, conductivity, pH, 
total organic carbon) rather than measuring a specific contaminant. By using surrogate 
parameters, the presence, identity, and concentrations of contaminants are inferred from 
measurements of other properties in the water. While the data from the surrogate 
measures may be reliable and accurate, the connection between the measured surrogate 
parameters with the identity and concentrations of a specific contaminant is difficult to 
establish (ASCE, 2004). 
Table 2.  Sensor Testing and Evaluation Programs 
Testing Agency Testing Program Comments References 
EPA Environmental 
Technology 
Verification 
(ETV) Advanced 
Monitoring 
Systems Center 
Voluntary vendor 
participation, chem./bio, 
stakeholder oversight, bench-
scale & field-scale 
Technical 
Contact: Eric 
Koglin 
EPA  Technology 
Testing and 
Evaluation 
Program (TTEP) 
Involuntary vendor 
participation, under 
preparation 
EPA, 2005 
Technical 
Contact: Eric 
Koglin 
ECBC Development and 
Engineering 
Center 
Water-Pipe-Loop testing for 
chem/bio agents 
Technical 
Contact: Alex 
Pappas 
 
Several testing programs such as the EPA’s Environmental Technology Verification 
(ETV) Program, EPA’s Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP), and the 
Development and Engineering Center program at the Edgewood Chemical Biological 
Center (ECBC) evaluate sensor performance.  These programs include bench-top and 
water-pipe-loop testing (see Table 2). To complement the efforts of these three programs, 
additional sensor testing is needed to correlate sensor surrogate parameters with specific 
contaminants and with chemical classes of contaminants. Additionally, sensor-response 
under the highly variable conditions of actual water distribution systems is currently not 
being measured in these testing programs. The varying conditions include different 
disinfection systems (e.g. chlorine vs. chloramines), changes in source water (e.g., ground 
water vs. surface water), and changes in seasonal and system temperature. Individual 
water utilities could make better informed sensor acquisition decisions if this additional 
data were available and accessible.  
 
3.3 Review of Sensor Placement 
Sensor placement is of concern to the water utilities as it involves planning and analysis, 
and has costs associated with the purchase, maintenance, and operation of individual 
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sensors. Sensor placement should be based on an analysis that both (1) minimizes a 
contamination-event’s impact on public health and (2) helps to identify emergency 
response and decontamination locations. Analysis of the distribution network, 
vulnerability assessment, threat analysis, and water usage are all components relevant to 
properly locating sensors within an EWS (Hasan et al, 2004). Additional physical 
requirements warranting consideration include sensor-cost, physical access to installed 
sensors, space limitations, infrastructure compatibility with sampling methods, access to 
power supplies, physical site security, and hydraulic conditions (ASCE, 2004). Hydraulic 
distribution modeling during the design process can help to resolve many of these issues. 
 
3.4 Hydraulic and Contaminant Transport Modeling of Distribution Systems 
Since water distribution systems involve a large number of unknowns, numerical models 
of water-flow and contaminant-transport such as EPANET (Rossman, 2000) are often 
employed to help site hydraulic equipment and sensors.  These models are also used in 
the consideration of optimal sensor deployment and for the analysis of potential and 
actual threats (e.g., the EPA TEVA Program employs the EPANET model with a 
stochastic ensemble approach, Murray, 2004). To use these tools, water utilities develop a 
hydraulic model of their distribution system typically based on the standard pipeline 
network models like EPANET (Rossman, 2000), WaterCAD (Haested Methods, 2002), 
and PipelineNET (SAIC, 2003).  
 
Preparation of the distribution system is the most critical and time-consuming step in 
running these models.  By combining the details of the network infrastructure, such as the 
location and size of the pipes, valves, connections, pumps, and pipeline roughness with a 
history of water inflow and outflow, a utility can track the movement of a contaminant 
within the pipeline-network with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  Once the lay-out of a 
distribution system and its associated flows and withdrawals are known, contaminant-
transport modeling within the pipeline network models can identify the spatial spread of 
contamination over time at different release points and can, thus, assist in sensor 
placement decisions (e.g., Uber et al, 2004; Hasan et al, 2004; KIWA, 2004; ASCE, 
2004; Glascoe, 2004; Murray, 2004).  A simple example of a small and closed water 
distribution system demonstrates the utility of a hydraulic model in guiding the placement 
of sensors. If the contaminant enters the system upstream and the sensors are located 
downstream, early warning of a large downstream population could potentially be carried 
out (Figure 1). If a contaminant enters the system downstream of the sensor locations, the 
sensor would not detect the contaminant due to direction of water flow and the utility 
would consequently have a diminished early warning capability (Figure 2).  Site-specific 
network models help to identify the relative importance of detecting low contaminant 
concentrations spreading through a large part of the distribution system (as in Figure 1), 
versus the importance of a rapid response capability to quickly identify larger toxic 
contaminant loadings limited to a specific region of the distribution system (as in Figure 
2).  More informed tradeoff decisions in sensor acquisition and deployment are available 
thanks to the network analysis to balance the cost of sensor placement with potential 
consequences. The hydraulic models also allow water-utilities to improve their pipeline 
system where necessary in order to optimize sensor placement decisions and to 
coordinate emergency response. 
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Figure 1.  A hypothetical water distribution system experiencing a wide dispersal of low contaminant 
concentrations (modeled using EPANET in Glascoe, 2004). 
 
3.5 Review of Response to Sensor Alarm  
Deployed sensors should alert the water utility to changes in the water system and, 
ultimately, should assist the utility in its emergency reaction and response.  To be a useful 
device, the sensitivity of the sensor must exceed the baseline water quality parameters. 
To minimize cost and to reduce public skepticism, it is necessary for a sensor to have 
minimal false-positive and false-negative responses, which requires an understanding of 
the specific baseline water quality of the distribution system for all normal operating 
conditions (ILSI, 1999).  Necessary baseline water quality conditions will vary from 
utility to utility as baseline conditions are affected by changes in source water, 
disinfection systems, and seasonal and system temperature/pH.  
3.5.1 Detect-to-warn versus Detect-to-treat 
As part of an EWS, the response to a contamination event can fall into two types: detect-
to-warn or detect-to-treat systems. Detect-to-warn systems employ sensors with sampling 
and detection times of a few seconds to a few minutes, whereas, a detect-to-treat system 
employ sensors with sampling and detection times of a few minutes to a few hours. 
Detect-to-warn systems are intended to prevent or minimize contaminant exposure to the 
population. Detect-to-treat systems attempt to identify the specific contaminant so that 
appropriate medical treatment and decontamination can be rapidly implemented. The 
current state of sensor technology and control over water distribution systems limits the 
type of EWS response that can be implemented.  However, sensor technologies and 
control systems are being developed that could improve response times (e.g., Battiston et 
al, 2001; Emili and Cagney, 2000; Hergenrother et al, 2000; Lang et al, 1999; Marshall 
and Hodgson, 1998).  Emergency preventive action will be successful only if there exists 
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a high degree of confidence in sensor results.  Such confidence requires a reduction in the 
likelihood of false positives.  An additional impediment to true detect-to-treat systems is 
the costly infrastructure requirements for implementing a response system:  a thorough 
detect-to-warn system would require a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week staffing of an 
emergency response center where staff can rapidly evaluate the real time sensor data 
streams to make appropriate emergency response decisions. 
 
SOURCE A
SOURCE B
Chemical
0.01
0.10
1.00
10.00
mg/L
Day 1, 4:00 AM
 
CONTAMINATION 
Figure 2.  A hypothetical water distribution system experiencing limited dispersal of high 
contaminant concentrations (modeled using EPANET in Glascoe, 2004). 
3.5.2 Distribution System Response 
When a sensor signals a change in water conditions, a realistic response protocol needs to 
be in place.  The most basic choices are (1) to shut down the system, (2) to divert/isolate 
the water, or (3) to open the system (ASCE, 2004; ILSI, 1999; and Kiwa, 2004). 
Distribution systems are designed for continuous flow and are not prepared for a total 
system shutdown that could have an extremely detrimental effect on the infrastructure. 
As modern distribution systems have numerous interconnected flow paths, the diversion 
or isolation of potentially contaminated water requires the development of a rapidly 
controllable system over the entire distribution network.  Such modifications necessary to 
a distribution system could involve significant and expensive changes to the 
infrastructure including re-routing of pipe networks and installation of diversion storage 
tanks or reservoirs. Alternatively, water within a distribution system can be flushed-out 
by opening fire hydrants.  This option, however, releases contaminated water from a 
closed system into the open with the possible unintended consequence of further 
exposing the populace to contamination. Depending on the water contaminant, flushing 
the distribution system into the environment could possibly cause even greater harm to 
the exposed population. With any of the three basic response options discussed above, 
valves need to be locatable and completely closeable. Thus, design of a water distribution 
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sensor system must include the expected utility emergency response that can be used to 
optimize the locations of new valves and sensors.   
 
4 Sensor Specifications and Selection Requirements 
Water monitoring sensors tend to fit into a set of three ‘tiers’ of varying speed-of-
response and sensor-complexity (Figure 3). Tier 1 sensors are typically a rapid response 
technology that continuously monitors key water quality parameters or specific 
contaminants to identify sudden changes in water chemistry within the pipeline; Tier 2 
sensors have a slower response, are chemical-specific, and will often be initiated by a 
Tier 1 sensor response; Tier 3 ‘sensors’ are slow but precise off-site evaluations that are 
usually associated with forensic analysis conducted well after the contamination event 
has occurred.  As this survey is concerned with EWS, our focus and technology list is 
mainly on Tier 1 and some Tier 2 sensors.  We do not focus on Tier 3 sensors. 
 
Figure 3. A multi-level monitoring strategy consists of three tiers of technology of varying speed and 
complexity. 
 
4.1 Rationale for Sensor Criteria 
There are many different types of both water-quality and contaminant sensors available. 
In the appendix of this document a compiled database of commercially available water 
monitoring sensors collected primarily from surveys performed by several organizations, 
(ASCE, AWWA, EPA, DOD, KIWA, and Sandia National Laboratories) is presented 
based on our review of the current market. Table 3 lists the important operating, 
economic, and performance sensor parameters that have been identified from our review 
of the technologies.  These listed parameters listed are employed to help catalog sensor 
technologies for our database, are useful to illustrate important differences between 
sensors, and can assist in the down selection of sensors for water utility use.  Appendix I 
of this document is an Excel spreadsheet database of commercially available sensors and 
their specifications. The database parameters are presented in a slightly different form 
than the Table 3 parameters due to vendor data availability and the need to develop a 
sorting/searching capability in the spreadsheet. Table 3 and the Appendix are also the 
basis for establishing an acquisition-criteria which ultimately are developed to assist the 
water utilities in their decision making process when selecting a sensor technology (see 
the example in Appendix III).   
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Our sensor recommendations result from the realities of water-utility needs and the 
available sensor technology. The list of potential drinking water system contaminants is 
long, even if only various acute biological and chemical agents are considered. 
Commercial sensor technology must be able to cover this list of potential threat agents if 
reliable detect-to-warn security is to be achieved. Our recommendations for current 
systems would implement sensors that evaluate numerous overall water quality 
parameters.  Detection of changes in the monitored water quality parameters would 
indicate contaminant infiltration into the distribution system. This approach has been 
supported by discussions with representatives of water utilities who can also utilize such 
sensors for optimization of water quality performance under regular conditions.  
 
4.2 Sensor Parameters 
Sensor parameters are the important categorizing attributes of a sensor and are useful for 
assisting in crucial decisions for selecting sensors for an intended application. The sensor 
parameters that cover our sensor selection criteria are based (1) on discussions with water 
utility representatives, and sensor technology representatives; and (2) on water sensor 
criteria previously established by other organizations (AWWA, 2005; KIWA, 2004; 
ASCE, 2004; AWWA, 2002). Detailed below are descriptions of each of the thirteen 
Table 3 sensor acquisition parameters.  
4.2.1 C1. Availability of Performance Test Data  
Testing programs that establish instrument performance in the areas of accuracy and 
precision, detection level, calibration stability, maintenance and operation issues, and 
ease of operation are viewed as highly desirable in making technology choices.   The 
EPA Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) program provides test data from 
voluntary commercial vendors, while the more independent EPA’s Technology Testing 
and Evaluation Program (TTEP) provides reliable performance information from an 
objective source. 
 
Table 3. Sensor acquisition parameters. 
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Sensor Specification Range 
C1. Availability of Performance Test Data (high, medium, low) 
C2. Calibration stability (fine, moderate, coarse) 
C3. Capability for Multiple-use (single, few, many) 
C4. Data Interpretation/Management Software (low, medium, high) 
C5. Detection Range/Sensivity (low, medium, high) 
C6. Installation Logistics (complex, routine, minimal) 
C7. Maintenance & Operations – Labor  Low, Moderate, High 
C8. Maintenance & Operations – Materials Low, Moderate, High 
C9. Rate of False +/- (low, moderate, high) 
C10. Response Time (slow, moderate, fast) 
C11. Sampling Configuration or Architecture (in-line, slip-stream, grab-sample) 
(continuous vs periodic cycling) 
C12. Technology Cost ($100 to $20000) 
C13. Technology Group  (See description below) 
4.2.2 C2. Calibration Stability 
The sensitivity and range of detection for each sensor is important for ensuring that the 
sensor is appropriate for meeting specific EWS needs. Sensors must be sensitive enough 
to detect contaminant levels at the thresholds where acute exposure is a concern, and 
must also respond if contaminant concentrations are extremely high (note that some 
sensors will provide no signal when the concentrations exceed the normal operating 
range). The sensors must also be precise enough to distinguish the difference between 
normal fluctuations and distribution system contamination.  Most sensors for direct 
distribution system monitoring have numerous small and sensitive components that are 
affected by environmental conditions. Few sensors have a long-term record of 
performance in distribution systems.  Durability and the ability to handle fluctuating 
environmental conditions over time are unknown for many sensors. Environmental 
conditions, such as temperature and pH, can affect factors such as sensor corrosion, 
sensitivity, and selectivity.  These conditions will vary between different distribution 
systems or even at different locations in the same distribution system.  
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4.2.3 C3. Capability for Multiple-use 
Some sensors are capable of detecting multiple specific contaminants or multiple non-
specific aqueous conditions. Sensors that can detect multiple specific contaminants utilize 
technology to separate the various contaminants into distinct signals, whereas sensors that 
detect multiple non-specific changes in water conditions utilize multiple sensors 
configured into a single installation platform. Either of these multiple-use sensors 
provides more information at each installation point than a sensor that detects only one 
water quality parameter. Typically, a utility has a strong interest in using multiple sensors 
to assess overall water quality as well as to detect a contamination event.  To that end, 
information or experience with the candidate sensors in a multiple-use environment is an 
important consideration in the selection process.   
4.2.4 C4. Data Management/Interpretation Software  
This parametric refers to the availability of software algorithms to process the 
multivariate data coming from the sensor in such a way that significant baseline 
excursion events caused by contamination can be reliably detected.  Additional 
considerations include determining whether the software can be obtained from a different 
vendor than the sensor vendor and whether the software can accommodate additional 
sensor data and “non-standard” data such as UV absorbance or total dissolved organic 
carbon. Other considerations include the degree to which site-specific “learning” by the 
analysis system is required to enable the reliable differentiation between normal baseline 
shifts and actual contamination events.  The degree of technical expertise required to set 
up and to optimize the software system for each monitoring site is an important 
consideration.   
4.2.5 C5. Detection Range/Sensitivity  
Water sensors may come in contact with a wide range of physical, chemical and 
biological conditions, and it is important to ensure that the range and performance of the 
sensors be compatible with the needs of the specific distribution-system in which they are 
to be placed. The sensor sensitivity and selectivity are likely to be affected as the 
conditions in the aqueous matrix changes.  Such changes need to be well characterized 
and understood in order to have confidence in its utilization. For a distribution system, 
aqueous conditions that may affect sensor performance include seasonal temperature 
fluctuations and changes in source water conditions; aqueous conditions will vary for 
different disinfection systems. Verification of sensor performance to meet sensitivity and 
selectivity requirements is critical to ensuring the fidelity of an EWS system. 
4.2.6 C6. Installation Logistics 
Depending on the sensor and its location, sensor installation can range from technically 
difficult and expensive to straightforward and relatively inexpensive. The size of the 
instrument is of some importance to the extent that it will fit in existing shelters, and 
many sensors may require specialized expertise for installation and set-up. Whether or 
not sensors installation requires service interruption is an important consideration as well.  
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4.2.7 C7. Maintenance and Operation -- Labor Requirements 
In addition to the purchase price of the sensor (see C12) and operational costs (see C8), 
sensors installed within a distribution system will require periodic maintenance with an 
associated cost.  Some sensors require more routine maintenance than others.  Depending 
on the availability of personnel and resources, the maintenance requirements can often be 
the most significant cost of a sensor.  Generally speaking, water utility operation and 
maintenance duties are performed by technicians with limited advanced training in 
analytical equipment, electronics, and/or chemistry. This greatly reduces the resources 
available to routinely service technically complicated instruments. Therefore, sensors that 
are simple to operate, troubleshoot, and maintain are preferred. Training requirements for 
technicians should be minimal and easily understood.  
4.2.8 C8. Maintenance and Operation -- Material Requirements 
In addition to the purchase price of the sensor (see C12) and labor costs (see C7), sensors 
installed within a distribution system will require periodic ‘material’ requirements with 
an associated cost.  Typically such requirements include power consumption and data 
communications, but some sensors also have components that are consumed during 
operation and require replenishment. Similar to maintenance costs, depending on the 
availability of personnel and resources, the operational requirements can often be the 
most significant cost of a sensor. Sensors requiring consumables are less desirable, but 
may be reasonable if the consumable is inexpensive and replenishment can be part of the 
regular maintenance cycle.  Additionally, the life expectancy of a sensor should be 
considered. Life expectancy of a sensor represents the time that a sensor can reasonably 
be expected to operate under normal conditions. The sensor may be able to perform 
beyond this time, but the required operation and maintenance costs may justify sensor 
replacement at the end of its life expectancy.  Depending on the initial sensor cost, longer 
life expectancies may mean lower replacement costs over time. The tradeoff between 
sensor cost and life expectancy should be evaluated in the context of each specific 
utility’s needs. While it is impossible to accurately assess the true costs of operations for 
each sensor in each distribution configuration, we have attempted to group operation 
costs using any guide from the manufacturer’s information and our best judgment into the 
following groups:  inexpensive ($0 to $100 per location per year), moderate ($100 to 
$1000 per location per year), and expensive (over $1000 per location per year). These 
costs should be recalculated for each distribution system assessment, as they may be 
unreliable for any specific application.  
4.2.9 C8. Monitored parameters 
Depending on the sensor technology, the characteristic of the distribution water that is 
being monitored can vary considerably from high contaminant specificity to completely 
non-specific. This sensor specification indicates the type of parameter the sensor is 
designed to detect. 
4.2.10 C9. Rate of false positives/negatives 
A false positive is a sensor’s signal that is interpreted as a change in conditions when, in 
fact, no such changes have occurred. A false negative is when a sensor does not signal 
when conditions have, in fact, changed. There are numerous reasons for such failures 
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including electronic issues, matrix effects, sensor misplacement or mis-installation, and 
simple sensor malfunction. For an EWS, false negatives are to be minimized to the 
greatest possible extent.  False positives must be low enough that a sensor alarm is not 
ignored and continues to receive an appropriate verification/emergency response. Note 
that most of the sensor manufacturers do not advertise the rate of false positives or false 
negatives.  
4.2.11 C10. Response time 
The sensor response time is critical when evaluating its applicability for an EWS. The 
response time is determined by the time from sensor exposure to sensor signal generation. 
This specification as reported in the database only relates to the sensor itself. The 
response time of the sensor differs from the response time of the EWS.  The EWS 
response time is roughly the cumulative time required for (1) the information from the 
sensor to be communicated to central processing, (2) the information from the sensor to 
be compared to regular distribution system fluctuations, and (3) the information from the 
sensor to be integrated into an EWS.  This EWS response time will be the expected 
additional time required after an event to begin a response to the emergency.  
4.2.12 C11. Sampling Configuration and Architecture 
We consider consider three separate sensor architectures:  (1) “in-line” sensors are 
situated directly into the pipeline and, subsequently cannot have a waste-stream; (2) 
“slip-stream” sensors measure water continuously diverted from the bulk flow; and (3) 
“grab sample” sensors measure water collected periodically from the distribution system. 
In-line and in-pipe sensors are preferred for their simplicity for analysis and sampling 
especially in remote locations. Slipstream sensors take water from the main water flow 
and usually produce a waste stream that must be diverted to a sewer-line. This diversion 
can require significant changes to the distribution system structure (ASCE, 2004). Grab 
sample analysis requires an actual sample to be taken from the water stream and 
transported to a field instrument. This is typically more labor intensive; and therefore, 
sample frequency is limited.  Instruments requiring a grab sample can not be monitored 
remotely and thus were included as Tier 2 products in the database. Open system sensors 
are often developed for other usages, such as groundwater monitoring and must be 
converted for pipeline distribution usage. 
Sensor sampling rates are an important consideration. Sensors that are not 
continuous monitors, often sample with a certain fixed frequency. Typical sample 
frequencies are less than a couple of minutes; however, longer frequencies may be 
preferred in specific circumstances (ASCE, 2004). The sampling cycle can either 
represent a discrete sample taken at specific intervals or a composite sample. The discrete 
sample would consist of water present only at the time of sampling/analysis. The 
composite sample would consist of all of the water present since the last sample/analysis.  
Some sensors automatically take a grab-sample when there is a significant change in 
conditions. This allows for Tier 2 or Tier 3 analysis to occur on the suspect water that 
caused the significant change in the initial sensor’s response. This is especially useful for 
transient water conditions where the suspect water could be downstream of the initial 
sensor by the time a manual sample could be taken at that location.  
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4.2.13 C12. Technology Cost 
Sensor cost is an important consideration for water utilities with limited budgets for 
sensor acquisition. Sensor costs affect sensor density, in that the lower the cost of the 
sensor, the more sensors can be purchased. Although some sensors can be expensive, it 
should be noted that the individual sensor cost is often negligible compared to installation 
and maintenance costs over the lifetime of the sensor (see C7 and C8).  In the database, 
we state only the listed price of the sensor; however, in assessing the real cost of sensor 
implementation, installation and maintenance costs (see C6, C7 and C8) of the individual 
distribution system need to be included in the total economic assessment.  
4.2.14 C13. Technology Group 
Numerous analytical approaches can be used to characterize changes in water distribution 
systems. In order to compare similar technological approaches in the cost and 
performance criteria, we have grouped sensors into basic analytical technology groups. 
While some sensors easily fit into certain defined groups, others do not. Where unique 
approaches are implemented, there will only be one item within a group. For clarification, 
“Electrochemical” is one of the Technology Groups listed in the database.  Numerous 
detection methods are based on electrochemical principles, and the particular method 
used by a given sensor for a given parameter is detailed in the “Specific Technology” 
subcategory.  In the case of multi-parameter sensors, Multi Parameter is listed as the 
Technology Group.   Although there may be some similarity between different sensor 
technologies, distinctions are made with regard to specific technologies. This information 
is included to assist the understanding of specific sensor differences in the cost and 
performance criteria within a given Technology Group. For example, within the 
“Electrochemical” Technology Group, conductivity can be monitored using an “Inductive 
Cell” or a “Toroidal” measurement.  Typically, the nomenclature used in the “Specific 
Technology” subcategory do not change when a Multi Parameter instrument is included 
as the particular technology could be matched up with individual parameters.    
 
4.3 Sensor Selection Requirements 
As part of the “Task 1” component of this Department of Homeland Security funded 
OTD project, we received guidance from a project Advisory Board. Table 4 lists the 69 
specific guidance points provided by the Task 1 team from the Water Security 
Demonstration Advisory Board concerning sensor selection criteria on January 10, 2005. 
 
Table 4.  Requirements for water sensing technologies as devised by the Water Security Demonstration 
Advisory Board – Jan. 10, 2005. 
Issue Requirement 
Technology requirements should primarily be stakeholder driven (comments from L 
Brooks, DHS)  
Focus on chemical contamination instead of specific human pathogens? Biological 
contamination (I thought we were going to entertain surrogate indicators to biologicals 
such as particles, turbidity, etc.) – we are in funded as part of the Chemical Portfolio 
(comments from L Brooks, DHS)    
General  
Meet needs of largest population possible - cover largest municipalities (comments from 
L Brooks, DHS). This statement seems to be in conflict with the first sentence above.  If 
we focus on the largest systems, it’s likely the solutions will not meet the needs of smaller 
utilities…but the solutions may be scalable.  
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Dual use – technology should span other programs and meet other needs Dual-use 
(comments from L Brooks, DHS)  
Multi-use sensors – can the same sensor be placed in multiple areas vs different sensors 
placed at many locations (installation, operation, maintenance issues).  
Want water quality baselines. Monitoring technologies should be used to establish water 
quality baselines from both the source water and distribution systems of a particular 
system. Sensors monitor for parameters that could be considered “indicators” and 
baselines must be established before contamination events may be recognized.  (comments 
from C Schreppel, AWWA/MVWA)  
Consider long term applications and emerging technologies (BioWatch technologies 
and other commercially available air monitoring instrumentation could be used if water 
could be aerosolized within a safe enclosed container). This would enhance the sensitivity 
of sensors. (comments from Y Mikol, NYCDEP)  
Detection of low-level environmental contaminants (pharmaceuticals, dairy and 
agriculture run-off issues) (comments from D Requa, DSRSD)  
Real-time online – sample every 15-20 even 60 minutes or so (comments from Y Mikol, 
NYCDEP)  
Dual use - accidental and deliberate contamination events detected (comments from Y 
Mikol, NYCDEP) Same comment as #4. I will add that testing should include some 
common accidental contaminants such as gasoline or diesel fuel and a voc 
(tetrachloroethylene?) Sensor that will detect a number of contaminants (rather than sensor 
specific to only one chemical/substance). Alarm must trigger grab sample and notification 
(text message). (comments from Y Mikol, NYCDEP)  
A flagging system based upon data received from sensors: send different alarms/text 
messages for a spike and for a persistent condition above threshold (best situation is the 
ability to log on network and view the data from that instruments and other related 
monitoring instrumentation on the network)    
Dual-use  
  
 
Characteristics of select technology as related to data output. – (comments from P 
Biedrzycki, Milwaukee)  
a. High specificity/sensitivity (low false positive rate and low threshold for detection)  
b. Robust, precise and reliable  
c. Easily interpretable data – visual and easily understood, non-ambiguous  
d. Sustainable (low maintenance and operational costs long-term).  
e. Rapid/continuous as well as “near” real time   
f. Easily integrated into existing systems and not stand-alone system.  
g. Can be used by utility for routine monitoring and water quality assurance.  
h. “Low tech” vs. “rocket science”  
i. Security issues (tamper-proof?)  
 
Ability to interpret data – what does the data mean?  Important to establish a data inference 
engine that can accurately monitor the severity of a detected incursion, estimate the 
potential outcome, and selectively alert and present the information to authorized users.   
(comments from C Schreppel, AWWA/MVWA)  
Data robustness from (un)published reports on priority contaminants   
Characteristics 
related to data 
output  
  
Consider daily operations – maintenance, robustness, ease of operation  
Consider long term deployment issues  
Consider cost included in installation, operation, and maintenance (routine calibration)  
Technology - 
basics  
Bear in mind that the technology has to be assimilated within a utility’s culture for doing 
business, the operator’s level of understanding of water quality – (comments from P 
Parekh, LADWP)  
j. Simplicity of instrument  
k. Operational flexibility – instrument should have an operational value.  
l. Maintenance should be within current expectations of time and materials.  
m. Union can have issues with new job requirements (use an exiting instrument or one that 
is similar and adapt it to different conditions is preferable to a new instrument)  
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Connection with how utilities currently manage water quality system events would 
provide credibility to efforts.  ((comments from P Parekh, LADWP)  
Connection with real-world problems that also have public health consequence 
(coliform, spike in turbidity, etc) would be of value.  ((comments from P Parekh, LADWP)  
Ability to integrate technologies into existing systems.  Monitoring technologies and the 
mechanisms to interpret the data should have the ability to be integrated into existing 
systems used by water systems (e.g. SCADA and GIS based technologies).  (comments 
from C Schreppel, AWWA/MVWA); Integration with other sensors – will the sensor 
integrate with existing sensors/monitoring devices? (comments from Y Mikol, NYCDEP)  
Current education level of staff. User friendly for operator level personnel, low 
maintenance.  (comments from C Schreppel, AWWA/MVWA); Level of expertise required 
to use the instrument - is it compatible with experience/education of staff (comments from 
Y Mikol, NYCDEP)  
 
Maintenance requirements, specifically calibration frequency (daily weekly by 
opposition to fish monitoring that can run unattended for 3-4 weeks) (comments from Y 
Mikol, NYCDEP).   
 
5 Technology Gap and Discussion 
Although major efforts are currently underway by utilities to secure their water 
distribution systems and to protect public health, there are currently no detect-to-warn 
systems available, as we have envisioned in this report.  This project’s task was to 
evaluate the current status of commercially available sensors for their use in water 
distribution monitoring systems. In this survey, we discovered numerous promising 
sensor technologies that are currently in development.  Promising technologies are under 
development that are primarily focused on rapid detection to achieve high contaminant 
specificity either through miniaturization of existing analytical approaches or the 
development of new sensors based on molecular interactions/binding to sensor surfaces 
(Battiston et al, 2001; Emili and Cagney, 2000; Hergenrother et al, 2000; Lang et al, 
1999; Marshall and Hodgson, 1998). These new technological developments may 
ultimately provide some of the sensors required for a proper detect-to-warn capability.  
 Currently the list of possible water contaminants is too long for any sensor array 
to be practical for a detect-to-warn system in the foreseeable future. In order to assist the 
development of sensors for detect-to-warn systems, a complete list of the acute 
contaminants where specificity is sought should be compiled based on realistic risk 
assessment scenarios.  
  In addition to the development of better, faster, and cheaper sensor technology to 
attain proper detect-to-warn systems, significant thought and financial investment must 
incorporate the necessary developments into new distribution systems, as well as the 
reengineering of existing systems. Such changes put an increased burden on the water 
distributor for support of homeland security needs. An EWS requires more than just the 
instrumentation of the water distribution system, it also requires that appropriate action 
be taken to minimize the loss of life during a contamination event. The decisions for 
appropriate response actions will be different depending on the configuration of the 
distribution system, and will need to have appropriate governmental and professional 
coordination/guidance to develop a consistent methodology for ensuring the protection of 
the public. 
 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
The security of our nation’s water supply has been a concern both before and after the 
events of September 11, 2001. Several notable studies have investigated water 
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distribution system security issues including studies by EPA, ILSI, AWWA, ASCE, and 
Kiwa. Several important issues have been identified through these efforts:  
• Given the current state of sensor technology, surrogate water quality parameters 
are the best approach for distribution system contamination event monitoring. In 
our sensor survey, we found a limited number of ‘Tier 1’ sensors that are 
commercially available. These few available in-line sensors generally measure 
surrogate parameters rather than specific contaminants. The need for additional 
monitoring to identify the specific nature of the contaminant is implied in this 
approach. 
• A clear understanding of the normal variability of baseline water data is needed 
to accurately interpret surrogate water quality data in a contamination event. 
Several testing programs are developing methods to address this issue including 
EPA ETV, EPA TTEP, and ECBC. 
• Distribution system contaminant transport modeling is an important component 
in the design of an EWS.  Contaminant transport and hydraulic computer models 
such as EPANET are available and are being used in programs such as EPA’s 
TEVA effort to assist in sensor placement, to determine possible contaminant 
transport pathways, and to assist in emergency response and forensic analysis. 
• The objective of an EWS in terms of detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat needs to 
be more clearly defined. 
• Emergency response protocols and procedures needed to react to contaminated 
water distribution systems require further development. 
• There exists a technology gap between current sensor technology and needed 
sensor technology for EWS.   
• To be deployed by utilities, sensors must generally be inexpensive, easy to 
maintain, reliable, and have a low rate of false positives and false negatives, 
among other requirements. 
• The particular needs of water utilities are site specific and will vary, within 
certain parametric bounds, from distribution system to distribution system. 
In developing solutions to these security issues, the needs and resources of the water 
utilities is of fundamental importance. For any solution to be helpful, it must be 
constructed within the water utilities’ available resources.   
 
7 Appendix I:  Compiled Database of Sensors 
(see attached document “Compiled Data Base of Water Sensors:  Instrument 
Descriptions” by Johnson et al., 2005) 
 
8 Appendix II: Programmatic Gaps and Proposed Resolutions 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has tasked a multi-laboratory team to 
evaluate current and future needs to protect the nation’s water distribution infrastructure 
by supporting an objective evaluation of current and new technologies. This effort has 
been funded as part of an Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD).  Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories were tasked with the 
development of a technology acquisition process, referred to as the Task 2 effort.  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories have met the 
requirements of this task with the following two deliverables: (1) Sensor Acquisition for 
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Water Utilities: A Survey and Technology List, UCRL-TR-210488/SAND2005-2671P 
and (2) Compiled Database of Water Sensors, UCRL-MI-211877 submitted April 29, 
2005 and May 2, 2005 respectively.  This appendix serves to identify potential areas for 
follow on effort and funding that are a natural progression of the Task 2 work.  
In Task 2’s review and compilation of the current state of water sensor technology 
and consultation with various members of the OTD Task 1 Advisory Board, we have 
identified two key areas that would benefit from additional funding and effort:  (1) the 
development of a more detailed methodology for selecting sensors for various specific 
applications, and (2) the expansion of the Task 2 sensor database into an advanced 
database. 
 
8.1 Toward a More Detailed Sensor Down Selection Criteria 
The Task 2 report, Sensor Acquisition for Water Utilities: A Survey and Technology List, 
UCRL-TR-210488/SAND2005-2671P, identifies sensor acquisition parameters in Table 
3 and in Section 4.2. Review of previous studies of Early Warning Systems (EWS), 
sensor technology, and discussions with water utilities demonstrate that no single sensor 
can meet all of the various water distribution systems’ needs (ASCE, 2004; AWWA, 
2005). While it would be convenient to apply a one-size-fits-all down selection process 
for all utilities, it would be inappropriate, as the selection of contaminant sensors is a 
complex problem that requires extensive and detailed analysis (AWWA, 2005; Kiwa, 
2004).  
It is desirable to have a down selection methodology that would be useful for 
specific classes of water distributions systems.  Categorizing water utilities into classes 
by, for example, the age or the size of the water distribution system, or by the financial 
resources available to the water utility, could assist in focusing the generalized sensor 
down selection process for specific utilities.  Such a refined down selection capability 
could involve a thorough system analysis including, but not limited to, water distribution 
system studies such as the TEVA effort to reduce parametric uncertainty in complex 
water distribution systems.  This tool may include multiattribute utility theory to evaluate 
alternatives for complicated problems with multiple objectives (e.g., Dyer et al., 1998), or 
might involve a stochastic approach to guide optimal sensor placement within 
distribution systems (e.g., Murray, 2004; Johannesson et al., 2004).  Such methodologies 
have been successfully applied to problems including the disposition of surplus weapons 
grade plutonium, the siting of an electricity generation facility (Dyer et al., 1998), 
improved predictions of contaminant transport through geologic material (Aines et al., 
2002), and improved sensor and source analysis for atmospheric dispersion problems 
(Johannesson et al, 2004). Additional fidelity could include the economic considerations 
for both (1) employing current technologies in an EWS role for water distribution 
systems and (2) developing emerging sensor technologies specifically for water 
distribution system use. 
While the authors of the Task 2 documents refer to sensor-placement issues, alert 
management, and emergency response, a few more references and discussion points may 
be relevant here.  Some of the emergency response capabilities that the Department of 
Homeland Security is investing in should be considered  -- for instance the recent 
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TOPOFF33 interagency exercise for emergency response to atmospheric release may be 
relevant to water distribution EWS emergency response issues.   
 
8.2 Toward an Expanded Sensor Database  
The sensor database, Compiled Database of Water Sensors, UCRL-MI-211877, was 
necessarily submitted as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet4 given the time and budget 
constraints of the OTD project.  While the database is comprehensive in both number of 
sensors represented with relevant attributes for selection criteria and is searchable on 
several different levels using the sensor parameters, this tool could be made more 
powerful by incorporating the list into an advanced and dynamic database such as 
Microsoft Access. To maintain its usefulness, the database would need to be a “living” 
document with a point of contact to add new sensor information as it became available. 
Additionally, a communication path, such as an internal web site, should be established 
that would facilitate sensor information going back and forth between water utilities, 
vendors, test programs, and the database point of contact. 
An alternative to developing a more advanced database is to incorporate the 
sensor database information into EPA’s comprehensive water sensor database currently 
being developed which would allow the DHS effort to add benefit to an existing program. 
The upcoming EPA database is likely to be the central source of sensor data and will be a 
resource to continue the dataflow with water utilities, vendors, and test programs. 
An inherent weakness on the part of the sensor database is the dependency on 
information from private vendors.  The gathering of current, relevant, and objective 
information is a difficult task.  To address this problem, comprehensive involuntary 
testing programs of sensors such as the EPA’s Technology Testing and Evaluation 
Program (TTEP)5 can provide reliable performance information from an objective source. 
 
9 Appendix III:  A Hypothetical Technology Down-Selection Process 
In this appendix we present an example of how a down selection of candidate sensor 
technologies could be carried out using utility-specific selection parameters for a 
hypothetical utility.  In the technology down selection process it is important to note that 
it is unlikely that a common set of selection criteria will represent the needs of each 
domestic water utility industry.  Each utility will possess specific needs and requirements 
that will be tempered by such factors as the size of the utility, the extent to which 
monitoring is already done, the utility’s capital improvements budget, the locally 
perceived contamination threat spectrum, as well as other factors.  Consequently, the 
following exercise is intended to be exemplary and not proscriptive.  Furthermore, it 
bears emphasis that the ability of the various candidate technologies to meet the outlined 
selection criteria cannot, in most cases, be fully determined from the instrument 
specification sheets provided by the instrument vendors.  In many cases, details required 
for a completely objective down selection process are not provided.  Often the type of 
information desired is only available through a testing program such as being advocated 
                                                 
3 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/exercises.htm#topoff3 
4 Note there is companion text in the document, Compiled Database of Water Sensors: Instrument 
Descriptions, UCRL-MI-211877, providing a summary of each of the sensors in the database. 
5 http://www.epa.gov/ordnhsrc/tte.htm 
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in the OTD Project.  In light of these shortcomings it is apparent that expert judgment is 
required in many cases to move the entire process forward.  As the various EPA-
sponsored testing programs such as the Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) 
program, the Advanced Monitoring Systems Center, and the Technology Testing and 
Evaluation Program (TTEP) continue to carry out testing, these information gaps may in 
fact be filled, thereby making the technology selection process less subjective for the 
acquiring utility.  
 
9.1 Hypothetical Monitoring Objective 
In this example, we assume that a hypothetical utility is interested in a moderate 
expansion of their existing monitoring capabilities for a contamination event with a 
specific interest in monitoring within their distribution system.  We further assume that 
the hypothetical utility is interested in the development of a “detect-to-treat” application 
in contrast to a “detect-to-warn” application.  A detect-to-treat application places less 
emphasis on the timeliness or the specificity of response since the assumption is made 
that additional instrumentation or diagnostics will be required to more fully ascertain the 
nature and extent of the contamination.  A detect-to-warn application, on the other hand, 
places the highest constraints on such a monitoring system since time is of the essence 
and false positive and negative rates must necessarily be low since decisions to warn the 
consumer may be based on this single tier of sensors alone.  The utility is interested in the 
detection of both chemical and biological contamination; however, given our common 
understanding of the present commercially available sensor systems for the detection of 
biological contaminants, there is an implicit understanding that chemical contamination is 
likely to be better addressed than biological contamination through the chosen 
technology.     
 
Table A1.  Parameters for Technology Down-Selection 
Parameter Utility Ranking 
C1. Availability of Performance Test Data High Priority 
C2. Calibration Stability Low Priority 
C3. Capability for Multiple-use  High Priority 
C4. Data Interpretation/Management Software High Priority 
C5. Detection Range/Sensitivity Medium Priority 
C6. Installation Logistics Medium Priority 
C7. Maintenance and Operation – Labor High Priority 
C8. Maintenance and Operation – Materials Low Priority 
C9. Rate of False +/- Low Priority 
C10. Response Time Low Priority 
C11. Sampling Configuration High Priority 
C12. Technology Cost Medium Priority 
C13. Technology Group – Multi-parameter High Priority 
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9.2 Hypothetical Utility Selection Criteria 
A list of sensor performance parameters, such as might be developed at a water utility for 
the selection of a sensor technology in order to expand the monitoring capability within 
the distribution system, are derived from Table 3 in the main text.  The utility then ranks 
the parameters C1 through C13 as being of “high”, “mid”, or “low” priority (see Table 
A1).  Each of these parameters and their associated ranking are further discussed in the 
context of the utility in the following paragraphs.      
9.2.1 C1. Availability of Performance Test Data  
This category holds a high priority for the utility since having knowledge of the long-
term reliability of the sensors, via third-party testing, is judged to be an important piece 
of information when final sensor selections are to be made.  Testing programs that 
establish instrument performance in the areas of accuracy and precision, detection level, 
calibration stability, maintenance and operation issues, and ease of operation are viewed 
as highly desirable in making technology choices.    
9.2.2 C2. Calibration Stability 
Calibration stability is of lower importance since the measured change in the baseline is 
of primary interest in this case and there is less interest in the absolute value of any of the 
measured parameters.  The expectation is that software algorithms associated with the 
multi-parameter sensors will be able to differentiate between the baseline perturbations 
caused by sensor drift or normal water quality changes and those caused by an actual 
contamination event.  
9.2.3 C3. Capability for Multiple-use 
The hypothetical utility has a strong interest in using these sensors to assess overall water 
quality for the consumer as well as offering additional detection capabilities for a 
contamination event.  To that end, information or experience with the candidate sensors 
in a dual-use environment will be an important consideration in the selection process.   
9.2.4 C4. Data Management/Interpretation Software  
This high-priority category refers to the availability of software algorithms to process the 
multivariate data coming from the multi-parameter sensor in such a way that significant 
baseline excursion events caused by contamination can be reliably detected.  This holds a 
very high priority in light of the fact that the utility is specifically interested in a multi-
parameter sensor.  Additional considerations include a determination of whether the 
software can be obtained from a vendor different than the supplier of the multi-parameter 
sensor and whether the software in can accommodate “non-standard” data inputs (such as 
UV absorbance or total dissolved organic carbon). Other considerations include the 
degree to which site-specific “learning” by the analysis system is required to enable the 
reliable differentiation between normal baseline shifts and actual contamination events, 
as well as the degree of technical expertise to set up and optimize the system for each 
monitoring site.   
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9.2.5 C5. Detection Range/Sensitivity   
While this parameter is certainly of interest to our hypothetical utility, its importance is 
deemed of intermediate value.  This is because the multi-parameter approach is intended 
to provide a “state-change” indication by examining trends in the physical parameter 
baseline.  Given that the water quality baseline is constantly changing, the sensitivity of 
the sensors becomes less important since the sensor system is essentially looking for 
gross changes within the system baseline in order to flag a possible contamination event.  
9.2.6 C6. Installation Logistics 
This category holds an intermediate priority for our hypothetical utility since, as noted 
previously, installation locations for the sensors have already been determined such that 
waste stream access and power/shelter are available.  The size of the instrument is of 
some importance to the extent that it will fit in existing shelters.  
9.2.7 C7. Maintenance and Operation – Labor  
This category also holds a high priority since, based on the hypothetical utility’s past 
experiences, labor costs required for long term maintenance and operation of the sensor 
systems will be the largest expense associated with the total life-cycle cost.  The 
hypothetical utility’s expectations are that each multi-parameter sensor unit will require 
no more than one hour of on-site technician service time per month.    The utility has an 
interest in expanding their autonomous sensor network within the distribution system.  
They are specifically interested in those sensors that can operate unattended for extended 
periods of time.  Consequently, this particular category holds a high priority.  Further 
implied is the feature of minimal personnel intervention during normal operation and a 
requirement that sensor output data be integrated into an existing utility SCADA system.     
9.2.8 C8. Maintenance and Operation – Materials 
Material costs associated with sensor upkeep do not hold a high priority with our 
hypothetical utility.  Based on the previous observation, the utility understands that most 
of the maintenance and operation costs will fall into the labor category and that sensor 
service and replacement costs will be relatively insignificant.     
9.2.9 C9. Rate of false positives/negatives. 
While the rate of false positives/negatives is an important consideration, especially for 
detect-to-warn systems, the priority is rated as low for our hypothetical utility.  This is 
because there is currently not enough information to define false +/- rates at this time for 
the candidate systems, largely due to a lack of third-party testing (see C1). 
9.2.10 C10. Response Time  
Since the application is detect-to-treat, response time for our hypothetical utility is less of 
a concern than it would for a detect-to-warn system.  Response time on the order of 15 
minutes is likely to be adequate for the intended application.   
9.2.11 C11. Sampling Configuration 
Sampling configuration refers to the nature of the sensor installation and can be either in-
pipe or external to the pipe for an autonomous sampler.  This holds a high priority for our 
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example utility since only in-pipe or small-footprint external-to-pipe configurations will 
meet the utility’s stringent installation requirements.  Installation will occur at pre-
determined locations with sewer connections so that a waste stream from the sensor will 
not pose any difficulties. 
9.2.12 C12. Technology Cost 
The cost of the sensor technology holds an intermediate priority with our hypothetical 
utility and is based upon the fact that, in the utility’s experience, maintenance and 
operation costs over the lifetime of the sensor system will dominate the total system cost.  
Acquisition costs in the range of $10,000 to $30,000 per sensor unit are not regarded as 
burdensome.   
9.2.13 C13. Technology Group 
The technology group is another high-priority selection parameter for our example utility, 
and in this case the utility is interested in the multi-parameter sensor category.  This 
category holds a high priority for the hypothetical utility, since they are aware that there 
is empirical evidence that simultaneous measurements of several physical parameters at 
the same location offers the potential to detect contamination events outside the normally 
observed physical parameter baseline excursions within the distribution system.  The 
combination of multiple sensors into one electronics package is appealing from the 
perspective of system cost, compactness, and overall efficiency.  Furthermore, the utility 
is interested in proven sensor technology, and, thus, the conventional sensor systems for 
physical parameters such as pH, conductivity, turbidity and residual chlorine are 
considered favorable candidates.  
 
9.3 Hypothetical Utility Candidate Technologies   
With the previous selection parametric criteria in hand, we now review the list of 
candidate technologies for the hypothetical utility, and perform a sensor down selection 
to a subset of technology candidates.  In the following paragraphs we consider the 
available technologies within the database in light of the selection criteria already 
outlined.  A technology down selection based a hypothetical utility’s interest in the multi-
parameter probe category only (see Section 9.3.13) is given in Table A2. 
9.3.1 Candidates and C1: Availability of Performance Test Data 
Of the subset of multi-parameter probes listed in Table A2, only the YSI Model 6600 
Extended Deployment Probe (6000 series in database) has undergone rigorous third-party 
testing as a part of the US EPA ETV Program.  Other probes from both Hach and YSI are 
in various EPA Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) test 
programs; however data from these programs may be proprietary and may not be 
accessible to the public. Limited testing of the WST Censar Multi-parameter probe has 
also been carried out by the EPA and selected utilities.     
9.3.2 Candidates and C2: Calibration Stability 
Various claims are made by vendors regarding calibration methodology and stability.  
Since the sensors are primarily intended for use as a baseline trending indicator, absolute 
calibration stability does not hold a high priority.  Furthermore, information on 
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calibration stability and required frequency is best obtained through third-party 
performance testing.   
9.3.3 Candidates and C3: Capability for Multiple-use  
All of the probes listed in Table A2 measure physical parameters that are of interest in 
general water quality measurements for the distribution systems, and, thus, are applicable 
for a dual use function.  Several of the probes (Primayer PrimeCense Color and Turbidity 
and WST Censar CT Sense) measure only temperature, turbidity and color, parameters 
that are judged to be too restrictive for a broad contamination detection capability.  
Consequently they are not included in the final candidate list to be discussed later.   
9.3.4 Candidates and C4: Data Interpretation/Management Software 
All of the probes listed in Table A2 have data loggers that can be purchased as an 
accessory to the probe unit.  All data loggers can be interfaced to a utility SCADA system 
as well.  With the exception of the Hach Pipesonde, these data loggers simply record the 
various parameters (e.g. temperature, turbidity, residual chlorine) and store them for time 
series plotting by an operator.  No multivariate analysis of the various sensor readings 
can be carried out with these basic data loggers.  Further data manipulation for increased 
ability to elucidate a possible contamination event would require additional software and 
computer facilities, possibly within the utility SCADA system.  The Hach product line is 
an exception in this case.  Hach offers an accessory product to the Pipesonde called the 
“Event Monitor” which includes a processor, display graphics, and proprietary statistical 
algorithms that further manipulate the multivariate data stream for increased ability to 
detect a contamination event.   
9.3.5 Candidates and C5: Detection Range/Sensitivity 
In general, the detection range and sensitivity of the various parameters are comparable 
as most manufacturers are using a similar technology base for their sensors.  Previous 
experience has shown that the following parameters hold the most importance for in-pipe 
contamination detection:  temperature, pH, conductivity, residual chlorine, dissolved 
oxygen and turbidity.  Measurement technologies for these parameters are relatively well 
proven. An exception in this case is the chip-based sensor offered by Primayer and WST.  
This is a relatively new technology that has a somewhat different technical foundation 
than most of the other probe technologies listed in the database.  Concentration ranges 
reportedly measured by these chip-based sensors are similar to the conventional sensors.  
Total organic carbon (TOC) has also been shown to be a useful parameter for the 
detection of contamination; however, none of the vendors offer TOC analysis in a probe 
format.  The TOC measurement capability is available in panel-mount configurations 
only.   
9.3.6 Candidates and C6: Installation Logistics 
All of the probes listed in Table A2 are in-pipe probes and require a similar penetration of 
the pipe in order to carry out the installation.  Thus further down selection is not 
warranted based on this criterion.       
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9.3.7 Candidates and C7: Maintenance and Operation – Labor & Materials 
Maintenance and operation details in the product brochures are limited for the probe 
models shown in Table A2.  Replacement sensor costs are typically less than $1000 and 
in all cases the required labor hours to carry out sensor change out and re-calibration are 
not given.  In view of the limited information provided, we assume that labor and 
material costs for these systems are comparable based on the similarities of their 
configuration. Nearly all the sensors listed in the database have some degree of 
autonomy, so this category is not useful for further down selection. 
9.3.8 Candidates and C8. M&O – Materials 
This priority is rated as low by the hypothetical utility.    
9.3.9 Candidates and C9. Rate of false positives/negatives. 
This priority is rated as low by the hypothetical utility, see Subsection 9.2.9. 
9.3.10 Candidates and C10: Response Time 
All listed instruments utilize relatively fast electrochemical principles for the detection of 
specific analytes and thus have response times that are typically less than one minute.  
Their response times are generally well within the desired 3-minute response time 
criterion.     
9.3.11 Candidates and C11: Sampling Configuration 
This high-priority category serves as another major filter for the candidate sensors.  A 
large number of the multi-parameter sensor systems listed in Table A2 are intended for 
open water use.  Many of these are probes are intended for depth profiling of ground 
water monitoring wells, reservoirs, oceans and lakes and are not particularly well suited 
for measurements in the vicinity of a water pipe.  To use them in a pipeline capacity 
would require additional engineering and fabrication of a water slipstream from the pipe 
into a measurement vessel positioned in the pipe’s vicinity.  The measurement vessel 
would enable exposure of the probe to the water slipstream flow.  Such additional 
engineering and fabrication requirements are beyond the scope of capabilities and/or 
budget of the hypothetical water utility and consequently, this subset of multi-parameter 
probes are eliminated from consideration.   
9.3.12 Candidates and C12: Technology Cost 
Costs for multi-probe sensors range from about $2,000 to over $25,000; and most of the 
probes sell in the range of $8,000 to $15,000.  As previously noted in the criteria, 
acquisition costs are considered to be of intermediate importance in the selection process, 
so costs do not form the basis for further technology down selection.   
9.3.13 Candidates and C13: Technology Group – Multi-parameter 
Our hypothetical utility has a specific interest in deploying multi-parameter sensor 
systems based on the perceived monitoring efficiencies to be gained by multiple probes 
serviced by a common electronics module.  The database contains 16 multi-parameter 
systems from 10 manufacturers.  The technology down-selection based on this category 
alone is given in Table A2.   
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Table A2.  Manufacturers and Models of Multi-Parameter Probes 
Manufacturer Model Max. Number of 
Parametersd
General Oceanics Ocean Seven 316 8 
Minilab 9 Greenspan 
CS 4 
Pipesonde 8 Hach 
Event Monitora N/A 
Hydrion BV Hydrion 10 15 
Datasonde 5 and 5X 16 
Minisonde 5 10 
Hydrolabb
Quanta 10 
In-situ MP Troll 9000 9 
PrimeCense - Multi-parameter 6 Primayerc
PrimeCense - Color and Turbidity 3 
UIT Multi-Sensor Module (MSM9) 9 
Censar – CT Sense 3 WST 
Censar - Multiparameter 6 
6920DW (6000 series) 6 YSI 
600DW-B (600 series) 5 
Table Notes: 
a The Hach Event Monitor is a data processing unit that is sold as an accessory to the Pipesonde.  The Event 
Monitor is not listed in the report database.   
b Hydrolab is a subsidiary of Hach, with shared probe technologies 
c Primayer is a UK company and WST is a US company offering the same product line. 
d Many of the probes can accommodate a broad range of plug-and-play sensors.  See the database for a 
listing of all of the possible combinations.     
 
9.4 Further Down Selection of Candidate Technologies  
Following the foregoing application of the hypothetical utility’s criteria, a further down 
selection of candidate probes in shown in Table A3.  The candidate technologies are 
essentially those with multi-parameter capabilities that can be installed in an in-pipe 
configuration.   
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Table A3.  Multi-parameter probes best suited for a water pipe monitoring 
application and parameter justification of highest consideration of a hypothetical 
utility. 
Manufacturer Model Rationale 
6000 series C1 (ETV tested) 
C11 (in-pipe config) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
YSI 
600 series C1 (no test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe config) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
Hach Pipesonde C1 (CRADA test in progress)  
C11 (in-pipe config) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
PrimeCense - Multi-
parameter 
C1 (no test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe config) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
Primayer
 
PrimeCense - Color and 
Turbidity 
C1 (no test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe config) 
C13 (limited param probe) 
Censar – Multi-parameter (limited test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe config) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
WST 
 
Censar –CT Sense C1 (limited test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe config) 
C13 (limited param probe) 
 
9.5 Final Technology Candidates for a Hypothetical Utility 
A further down selection of candidate probe technologies is shown in Table A4 and is 
based on the fact that two of the probes, the Primayer PrimeCense-Color and Turbitiy and 
the WST Censar-Mulit-parameter have a limited analysis capability—only measuring 
temperature, color and turbidity.  The other probes include can measure additional 
physical parameters that are more directly related to potential contamination events.  
Thus, these two probes are eliminated in the final candidate technology list in Table A4. 
 
9.6 Other Considerations 
Based on a systematic application of the down-selection criteria described previously, the 
probes listed in Table A4 are best suited for the intended hypothetical utility application.  
Some questions remain concerning the availability of multivariate data processing 
software to improve contamination detection.  It is quite possible that the Hach Event 
Monitor data processing module can be used with sensor inputs from other probe 
manufacturers; however, this is not known for certain.  If it is in fact true, then any one of 
the probe vendors could be an option in combination with a statistical data processing 
module such as the Event Monitor.  On the other hand, algorithms for statistical 
manipulation of the data could be developed under an independent effort and integrated 
into an existing utility SCADA system; however, development and testing costs could be 
significant if this particular pathway were chosen.  
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If a statistical processing system is incorporated into the multi-parameter system, 
an additional consideration should be an assessment of the ability of the system to 
incorporate additional sensor inputs.  As noted previously, measurements of total organic 
carbon have proven useful for contamination event detection.  Similarly ultraviolet 
probes offer similar advantages for increasing the sensitivity for contamination events.  In 
light of these considerations, the final selection should take into consideration whether 
the system can be upgraded by the addition of other sensors in addition to those within 
the multi-parameter probe.      
 
Table A4.  Final Candidate Technologies For a Hypothetical Utility. 
Manufacturer Model Rationale 
6000 series C1 (ETV tested) 
C11 (in-pipe configuration) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
YSI 
600 series C1 (no test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe configuration) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
Hach Pipesonde C1 (CRADA test in progress)  
C11 (in-pipe configuration) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
Primayer
 
PrimeCense - Multi-
parameter 
C1 (no test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe configuration) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
WST 
 
Censar – Multi-
parameter 
C1 (limited test data available)  
C11 (in-pipe configuration) 
C13 (multiparam probe) 
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